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THE PSYCHIATRIST AS EVALUATOR: CONFLICTS AND
CONSCIENCE
ROBERT T.M. PHILLIPS, M.D., PH.D.*

In the past decade, nothing has sparked more intense debate among
psychiatrists than their role in capital sentencing proceedings.'
Unfortunately, the discussions thus far have been characterized far too
often by impassioned rhetoric rather than by informed reason. The
controversy is also inherently more appropriately characterized as a
conflict of moral position rather than one of ethical dilemma. An
individual's personal belief regarding the propriety of capital punishment
is, in fact, a personal, moral opinion held by an individual. If the
individual happens to be a physician, it may be logically assumed that, as
a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life, participation in a
legally authorized execution would be a direct violation of ethical
standards of conduct. 2
What then defines physician participation in capital sentencing
proceedings, and how does one understand the appropriate or
inappropriate roles that physicians may play in an execution? There are
three categories that define physician participation in executions: (1)
actions that directly cause the death of an individual; 3 (2) actions that
* Deputy Medical Director, American Psychiatric Association, Washington, D.C.

1. See generallyM. Gregg Bloche, Psychiatry, CapitalPunishment,and the Purpose
of Medicine, 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 301 (1993); Fred Bonner et al., Physician
Involvement in CapitalPunishment,91 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 15 (1991); Richard J. Bonnie,
The Death Penalty: When DoctorsMust Say No, 305 BRIT. MED. J. 381 (1992); William

J. Curran, PsychiatricEvaluationsand Mitigating Circumstancesin Capital-Punishment
Sentencing, 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1431 (1982); Charles Patrick Ewing, Diagnosing

and Treating "Insanity" on Death Row: Legal and Ethical Perspectives, 5 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 175 (1987); Ebrahim J. Kermani & Jay E. Kantor, Psychiatry and the Death
Penalty: The Landmark Supreme Court Cases and Their Ethical Implications for the
Profession, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 95 (1994); Douglas Mossman,
Denouementof an Execution Competency Case: Is PerryPyrrhic?,23 BULL. AM. ACAD.

PSYCHIATRY & L. 269 (1995); Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution
Competency: FordingMurky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1992); Robert

D. Truog & Troyen A. Brennan, Participationof Physiciansin CapitalPunishment,329
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1346 (1993); Barbara A. Ward, CompetenceforExecution: Problems

in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35 (1986); Howard Wolinsky, US
Physicians Debate CapitalPunishment, 346 LANCET 43 (1995).
2. See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Physician
Participationin Capital Punishment, 270 JAMA 365, 365-68 (1993) [hereinafter CEJA

Report].
3. See id. at 368.
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assist, supervise, or contribute to the ability of another individual to
directly cause the death of the condemned; 4 and (3) actions that
automatically cause an execution to be carried out on a condemned
prisoner.5 There is little disagreement within the profession that any
action that directly contributes to the death of a condemned individual is
inherently unethical. 6 Activities that would be considered participation in
an execution include prescribing or administering medications that are part
of an execution protocol, selecting injection sites, starting intravenous
lines as ports for lethal injection devices, or prescribing, preparing,
administering, or even supervising the injection of drugs for the purpose
of lethal injection by nonmedical personnel. 7 Additionally, the American
Medical Association (AMA) Policy Compendium' suggests that
participation in an execution also includes, but is not limited to, the
monitoring of vital signs (on site or remotely), attending or observing an
execution in the role of physician, and rendering technical advice
regarding the execution process. 9
It would seem, then, that part of the controversy rests with the
interpretation or definition of what actions essentially assist or contribute
to the ability of another individual to directly cause the death of a
condemned prisoner, and, to a lesser extent, what actions could
automatically cause an execution to be carried out.'0 It is the position of
those who espouse a moral opposition to psychiatrists participating in
capital sentencing proceedings that assisting or aiding another to conduct
an execution or performing a task that automatically causes an execution
to be carried out violates the canons of medical ethics."I The position is
grounded in the fundamental ethical concept ofprimum non nocere (above
all, do no harm)'2 and is the foundation for arguments for abstention by
psychiatrists from these legal proceedings. 3 Setting aside for the
moment the clinical implications of abstention, the assumption of such
4. See id.

5. See id.
6. See id. at 366.
7. See id. at 366, 368; AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, POLICY COMPENDIUM § 2.06
(1996).
8. AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, supra note 7.
9. Id.; see CEJA Report, supra note 2, at 366, 368.
10. See CEJA Report, supra note 2, at 366-68.
11. See Bonnie, supra note 1, at 381.
12. See Bloche, supra note 1, at 310 & nn.46-47; CEJA Report, supra note 2, at

365.
13. See CEJA Report, supra note 2, at 366.
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posture could have profound implications for the legal system as a matter
of public policy. 4
There are three areas of potential involvement for psychiatrists in
The first encompasses pre-sentence evaluations,
capital cases.' 5
including competency to stand trial, the provision of expert psychiatric
testimony during a trial, and psychiatric opinions regarding relevant issues
of aggravation or mitigation during the penalty phase of a trial. 6 The
second is during the evaluation of a condemned prisoner's competency to
be executed.' 7 Finally, physicians might be involved in psychiatric
treatment of a condemned inmate on death row in response to an acute
emergence of symptoms or to restore an incompetent inmate to
competency for execution.' 8 The balance of this article will examine two
of these activities-specifically, pre-sentence evaluations and the treatment
of inmates to restore competence to be executed-in the context of the
ethical and moral objections that are raised by this controversy.
Regarding pre-sentence evaluations, to assume the abstention position
would have a profound impact on the lives of the condemned. It would
deny the accused their Eighth 9 and Fourteenth Amendment 2' rights and
greatly underestimates the importance of competent and reliable
14. See generally James C. Beck, M.D., The Role of Psychiatry in Death Penalty
Defense, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 453, 455 (1993) (stating that
"[pisychiatric assistance is essential in preparing adequately for a sentencing trial" and
that the "purpose of [psychiatric] testimony is to help the sentencing jury see the
defendant as a person, rather than solely as an incarnation of evil").
15. Others have described as many as eight potential roles for the psychiatrist. See
Bloche, supra note 1, at 311-16 & nn.51-78.
16. See CEJA Report, supra note 2, at 367; see also Harvey Bluestone et al., A
Study of Criminal Defendants Referred for Multiple PsychiatricEvaluationsRegarding
Their Competency to Stand Trial, 26 J. FORENSIC Sci. 416 (1981) (discussing forensic
psychiatry's role in the determination of a defendant's competency to stand trial); Barbara
Bolsen, Strange Bedfellows: Death Penalty and Medicine, 248 JAMA 518, 519 (1982)
(noting that a physician's testimony can play a key role in capital cases).
17. See CEJA Report, supra note 2, at 367.
18. See id.
19. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments be inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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psychiatric testimony as a function of due process. 2' Absence of
competent and reliable psychiatric testimony would substantially weaken
the ability of a defendant to provide substantive evidence in matters
concerning sanity, competence, and mitigation. 2
Issues of specific
intent, diminished capacity and duress, and domination by others are
viewed by the court through the psychiatrist's eyes.'
Psychiatric
opinions have profound implications for defense challenges to events
surrounding arrest and subsequent issues of contention, such as consent to
search, Miranda waiver, and the reliability of confession.24
The
devastating impact on due process is overshadowed only by the
21. See Nancy S. Horton, Comment, Restoration of Competency for Execution:
Furiosus Solo Furore Punitur, 44 Sw. L.J. 1191, 1195-1200 (1990); see also G. Linn
Evans,Perryv. Louisiana:Can a State Treatan Incompetent Prisonerto Ready Him for
Execution?, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 249, 253-54 (1991) (noting that
every death penalty jurisdiction prohibits the execution of the incompetent condemned
as a matter of Constitutional law); Marianne Kastrup, Psychiatryand the Death Penalty,
14 J. MED. ETHICS 179, 179-83 (1988) (noting that it is unconstitutional to execute a
prisoner who becomes insane while awaiting execution); William T. Pizzi, Waiver of
Rights in the InterrogationRoom: The Court'sDilemma, 23 CONN. L. REV. 229, 239
(1991) (discussing Colorado v.Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), where a psychiatrist
testified as to defendant's understanding of Miranda warning despite impaired volitional
capacity). But see Michael L. Radelet & George W. Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric
Determination of Competency to be Executed, 14 BULL.AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
37, 47-48 (1986) (stating that a psychiatrist's opinion about a prisoner's competency to
be executed cannot be challenged in an adversarial judicial process, and is therefore
unlike testimony in a competency to stand trial hearing).
22. See Horton, supra note 21, at 1201-02; see also Bloche, supra note 1, at 312
(discussing central role of psychiatric testimony and diminished capacity plea); Curran,
supra note 1 (noting that psychiatric evidence can be used to establish mitigating
circumstances); Peter R. Dahl, Legal and Psychiatric Concepts and the Use of
Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials, 73 CAL. L. REV. 411 (1985) (asserting the
essential involvement of psychiatrists in establishing required mental states of diminished
capacity defense). But see Karen Huey, A Mental HealthLaw Symposium on the Insanity
Defense and Civil Commitment, 29 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 443, 446 (1978)
(stating that the determination of competency to stand trial is "essentially a legal one").
23. See generally Dahl, supra note 22 (discussing psychiatric concepts as related to
the law); John F. Fitzgerald et al.,
Competency Evaluations in Connecticut, 29 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 450 (1978) (discussing procedures for conducting competency
evaluations); William T. Pizzi, supra note 21.
24. See John Blume, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Cases, ADVOCATE,Aug.
1990, at 42; Richard J. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty:
Conscientious Abstention, ProfessionalEthics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 67, 68 (1990); Dahl, supra note 22; Pizzi, supra note 21.
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extraordinary na'vet6 of those who believe that abstention will bring a halt
to capital punishment.'
If one truly assumes that the principal of non-maleficence should be
rigidly adhered to by the psychiatric profession, then one must conclude
that psychiatric participation in any form of legal proceeding would be
ethically objectionable. 2 6 The absence of outrage regarding other forms
of forensic psychiatric activity suggests that those who oppose psychiatric
involvement in capital sentencing cases do so on the ground that the death
penalty is somehow only different in degree from other punishments.2 7
As such, one must conclude that clinical participation in capital cases is,
in principal, no more or less problematic than forensic participation in any
criminal case. Professor Richard Bonnie" poignantly argues that,
[t]he question then, is whether the distinction between death and
other harms has a categorical force in ethical terms.
Contemporary discussion of ethical issues in the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment suggests that it does not,
and that preservation of life is not always the paramount ethical
value, even in the context of the physician-patient relationship.29
While many hold strong opinions about the propriety of involvement
of a psychiatrist that may lead to execution, there is no ethical barrier to
testifying at the pre-trial, trial, or sentencing phase in a capital case.30
Despite the heavy reliance on psychiatric testimony, the psychiatrist is
25. See Louis Jolyon West, M.D., PsychiatricReflections on the Death Penalty, 45
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 689,700 (1975) (advocating "doctor's boycott of executions"

as a means of abolishing the death penalty).
26. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Competence to be Executed: Another Conundrumfor
Mental Health Professionals, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 682, 683 (1986);

Bonnie, supra note 1, at 381; Bonnie, supra note 24, at 75-76; Kastrup, supra note 21,
at 180.
27. See Richard J. Bonnie, Healing-Killing Conflicts: MedicalEthics and the Death
Penalty, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12, 13 (1990); see also Bloche, supra note 1, at 329
(questioning the differences between death and other sanctions); Bonnie, supra note 1,
at 381 (noting that it is "difficult to sustain the argument that medical testimony that
might lead a judge to impose a death sentence violates medical ethics even though
testimony that might lead the court to impose long term, and often debilitating,
imprisonment does not").
28. John S. Battle Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Law, Psychiatry and
Public Policy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
29. Bonnie, supra note 27, at 13.
30. See generally Bonnie, supra note 24, at 76-77; Kastrup, supranote 21, at 179,
181.
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neither the judge nor the executioner. 3' The psychiatrist does not make
the formal determination of competence that results in the ability to stand
trial or to be sentenced to execution. 32 The judge or jury plays that
critical role in the adjudicatory process; the psychiatrist offers an opinion.
It should also be noted that, given the adversarial nature of our judicial
system, a contrary clinical opinion may, in all likelihood, be offered by
another psychiatrist.3 3
Testimony regarding competence to be executed, however, raises
related but unique issues.
First is the presumption that execution
competency evaluations transcend mere participation in the administration
of justice,'M which would seem to characterize all other forensic
activity,35 and place the practitioner in the new role of participating in
the administration of punishment. 3 6 The former would be characterized
as ethically permissible, the latter as ethically objectionable. 3 7 Execution
competency evaluations are not clearly distinguishable from other modes
of clinical participation in the correctional process.3" Forensic evaluators
are frequently called upon to conduct evaluations for the purpose of
classification, triage and institutional assignment, and transfer to
psychiatric facilities.39
These evaluations have provided the
underpinnings for parole board determinations for decades.'
There is
inherently nothing different in assessing someone's competency to be
executed from performing an evaluation of someone's competency to stand
trial, competency to execute a will, or competency to remain at liberty in
society in the face of acute mental illness."'
31. See Bloche, supra note 1, at 316-17; CEJA Report, supra note 2, at 367.
32. See Bloche, supra note 1, at 316-17; CEJA Report, supra note 2, at 367.
33. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 934 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the presentation of defense psychiatrists [may] convert the death
sentence hearing into a battle of the experts"); see also Appelbaum, supra note 26, at
683 (noting that "[p]sychiatrists may be asked by the defense, the prosecution, or the
court to evaluate the defendant and to testify at trial regarding the relationship between
the alleged crime and the defendant's mental state at that time"); Bloche, supra note 1,

at 312 (discussing the need for clarification regarding a prisoner's right to call his own
experts at a competency hearing).

34. See Appelbaum, supra note 26, at 682-83; Bonnie, supra note 1, at 381.
35. See Appelbaum, supra note 26, at 682-83; Bonnie, supra note 1, at 381.
36. See Appelbaum, supra note 26, at 682-83.
37. See Bonnie, supra note 24, at 79.

38.
39.
40.
41.

See id. at 79-80.
See id. at 80.
See id.
See Appelbaum, supra note 26, at 682.
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What does unequivocally distinguish these evaluations from other
forms of forensic evaluation is the immediacy of the link between the
evaluator's opinion and the decision as to whether the person being
evaluated will live or die.42 As in pre-sentence activity, the physician's
role in this process is supportive rather than causal.43 Again, the
physician acts as an advocate of justice, not as a source of punishment.'
The opinion regarding competence to be executed will be weighed by a
finder of fact and a decision will be made within the appropriate
jurisprudential framework.' The psychiatric evaluation is only one piece
of a complicated matrix that is taken into account by the ultimate decision
maker who is respectful of constitutionally guaranteed rights of due
process in the most critical aspect of the adjudicatory spectrum.'
Undoubtedly, the most complicated ethical dilemma is posed when a
physician is asked to treat an individual for the express purpose of
restoring them to competency for execution. 7 Indeed, these individuals
are often severely mentally ill and experience acute psychosis that
manifests as self-destructive behavior, which poses great potential harm
42. See Bonnie, supra note 24, at 80-81.
43. See id. at 79-80.
44. See Paul S. Appelbaum, The Parable of the ForensicPsychiatrist:Ethics and
the Problem of Doing Harm, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 257 (1990); Bonnie,
supra note 24, at 80.
45. See CEJA Report, supra note 2, at 367.
46. See id.
47. See Bonnie, supra note 24, at 82-83 (stating that most difficult ethical questions
arise after prisoner has been declared incompetent to be executed); see also Evans, supra
note 21, at 263 (recognizing that psychiatrists have an ethical dilemma in treating
condemned inmates); Kirk Heilbrun et al., The Debate on Treating Individuals
Incompetent for Execution, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 596, 604 (1992) (stating that
competency for execution presents complex ethical and moral problems); Kastrup, supra
note 21, at 181 (recognizing that there is no easy answer to dilemma of treating
incompetent prisoner when treatment may result in prisoner's execution); Radelet &
Barnard, supra note 21, at 49 (discussing the ethical issues in treating a man so that he
can be restored to competency to be executed); Michael L. Radelet & George W.
Barnard, Treating Those Found Incompetentfor Execution:Ethical Chaoswith Only One
Solution, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297, 305-06 (1988) (suggesting that
the issue of treating mentally incompetent death row prisoners creates conflict in the
minds of treatment staff); Ptolemy H. Taylor, Execution of the "Artificially Competent":
Cruel and Unusual?, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1045, 1063 (1992) (noting that all psychiatrists
must reconcile the ethical dilemma).
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to themselves and others. 48 Three positions have emerged regarding the
treatment of persons deemed incompetent for execution: never treat,
sometimes treat, and always treat.49
Those that espouse the "never treat" philosophy believe that the relief
of suffering is not a sufficient justification for providing treatment in large
measure because such treatment would allow the infliction of greater
harm." Critics of this position, however, immediately point to the flaw
in such reasoning." They suggest that by not treating, one de facto
creates a greater state of harm to the individual because their suffering
escalates as they are subject to the ravages of their mental illness. 2 The
"sometimes treat" position, the most widely adopted position among those
engaged in this debate, suggests that treatment should be provided only
when the inmate wants to be treated. 3 While this position seems most
consistent with other ways of approaching clinical matters within the
rubric of informed consent, it, by definition, raises the obvious question
of the ability of an incompetent prisoner to give informed consent for
treatment. 54 The law has, however, addressed such dilemmas outside the
arena of capital punishment with legal procedures such as living wills and
substituted judgements, including next friend determinations. 5"
The
"always treat" position functionally disregards the consequence of
treatment by focusing solely on the delivery of clinical service as the
appropriate and singular responsibility of the mental health practitioner. 6
In this context, there is an adherence to the belief that the psychiatrist's
primary role as a physician is to relieve pain and suffering whenever and
wherever it presents itself, 7 and therefore, this position removes itself
48. See Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and
PsychoeducationalCharacteristicsof 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 840 (1986); see also Kastrup, supra note 21, at 181-82
(discussing psychiatric problems of death row prisoners).
49. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supranote 44, at 256; Bloche, supra note 1, at 345-51;
Bonnie, supra note 24, at 83; Heilbrun, supra note 47, at 598.
50. See Appelbaum, supra note 44, at 683; Ewing, supra note 1, at 183.
51. See Ewing, supra note 1, at 183-84.

52. See id.
53. See Bonnie, supra note 24, at 83; Heilbrun, supra note 47, at 601, 604.
54. See Bonnie, supra note 24, at 83-84; Heilbrun, supra note 47, at 604.
55. See, e.g., In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061, 1066-69 (Del. 1995) (describing
Delaware's Death With Dignity Act, 16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2501 (1993),

established to provide for termination of medical treatment or life support for
incompetent individuals).
56. See Heilbrun, supra note 47, at 598.

57. See id.
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from entrapment in the political discussion. 8 This is also the position
espoused by the Section of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences of the
National Medical Association (NMA):
[Tihe treatment of a "death row" inmate's mental illness does not
imply that the treating psychiatrist agrees with capital punishment
but rather is committed to the adequate health care of the
correctional population, and realizes the nature of the sentence the
inmate has to serve is a legal issue in the purview of
jurisprudence and not psychiatry ...
The Section also asserts that an inmate facing execution
deserves the same type of psychotherapy that a terminally ill
patient deserves, i.e. psychotherapy designed to work through the
psychological issues everyone grapples with when knowingly
facing death (shock, anger, denial, depression, and acceptance).
The fact that "death row" inmates would not be given the
opportunity to engage in either psychiatric and/or religious
counseling to prepare for their death is reprehensible. 9
The position of the NMA essentially is one that presumes the "always
treat" posture is rooted in a commitment towards the provision of clinical
care and the restoration of human dignity.'
It should also be understood that the Section of Psychiatry of the
NMA is mindful of the disproportionate representation of persons of color
on death row and their particular commitment to the service of that
population. 6' These issues, though somewhat tangential to the points
under consideration in this discussion, are worthy of mention. The death
penalty is the harshest manifestation of discrimination against persons of
color in this country.62 In all of my years of conducting forensic
evaluations in capital sentencing proceedings, it has become clear that the
58. See id.

59. National Med. Ass'n Section on Psychiatry & Behavioral Sciences, Position

Statement on the Role of the Psychiatrist in Evaluating and Treating "Death Row"
Inmates 3 (1986) [hereinafter National Med. Ass'n] (on file with The New York Law
School Law Review).
60. See Heilbrun, supra note 47, at 598.
61. See National Med. Ass'n, supra note 59, at 2 (noting that "a vast number of
inmates on 'death row' are members of minority groups").
62. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (stating that "Negroes [are] executed far more often than whites in
proportion to their percentage of the population" and that "while the higher rate of
execution among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of
racial discrimination").
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color of one's skin, the amount of money one has for an attorney, and the
passions of the moment, play a much greater role in determining who dies
than the circumstances of the crime involved or the background of the
person on trial. 63 There are nearly 3000 persons confined on death row
in the United States today.'
A disproportionate number of them are
persons of color 65 and almost all of them are poor.' The quality of
legal assistance, or the lack of it, is a critical problem for the poor who
comprise the vast majority of those sentenced to die. 7 The issues of
race and poverty are at play whenever the state seeks the death penalty.68
It is likely, then, that these issues also complicate, consciously or
unconsciously, positions that are assumed regarding psychiatry's role in
capital sentencing proceedings and, most particularly, the role of
psychiatrists in the context of treating persons incompetent for
execution. 69
In the most recent report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs (CEJA) of the AMA entitled Physician Participation in Capital
Punishment: Evaluations of Prisoner Competence to be Executed;
Treatment to Restore Competence to be Executed,7" CEJA concluded that
it is acceptable for physicians to provide testimony regarding competence
to be executed. The CEJA report stated that physician participation in
evaluations of a prisoner's competence to be executed may be ethical when
the physician's medical opinion is just one aspect of the information taken
63. See Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense
Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 410-12 (1995)
(discussing the relationship between socioeconomic factors, such as race and poverty, and

death sentencing); see also Stephen B. Bright, Counselforthe Poor: The Death Sentence
Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994)
(noting that "[p]oor people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who
lack the skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters").
64. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1994, at 587-99 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastor
eds., 1995).
65. See id.
66. See Vick, supra note 63, at 410-12.

67. See id.
68. See id. at 335 & n.24.

69. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
70. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Physician
Participationin CapitalPunishment:Evaluationsof PrisonerCompetence to be Executed;
Treatment to Restore Competence to be Executed, CEJA Report 6-A-95 (1995) (on file
with New York Law School Law Review).
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into account by the ultimate decision maker, a role that legally should be
assumed by a judge or hearing officer. 7 '
Regarding the more complex issue, when a condemned prisoner has
been declared incompetent to be executed, the AMA takes the following
position:
[P]hysicians should not treat the prisoner to restore competence
unless a commutation order is issued ....
. . . [However, i]f the incompetent prisoner is undergoing
extreme suffering as a result of psychosis or any other illness,
medical intervention intended to mitigate the level of suffering is
ethically permissible ...
. . . [Reevaluation of] the prisoner's competence to be
executed should be performed by an independent physician
examiner. 72
Additionally, a physician cannot be compelled to participate in this
evaluative process if it is contrary to the physician's personal beliefs. 3
The conflict of conscience that arises when psychiatrists are engaged
in both evaluation and treatment of individuals on, and en route to, death
row may be likened to the balancing of the principles of beneficence and
non-maleficence resting on the fulcrum of one's personal beliefs. Such an
analysis, then, would render this a discussion of moral acceptability, as
viewed by the practitioner, rather than ethical conduct, as defined by a
profession.

71. See id. at2.
72. Id. at 4.

73. See id.

